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INTRODUCTION

In the 1990s, Congress began to devote increased attention to
the problem of domestic violence, 1 a rampant national problem with
social and economic costs. 2 At the same time, concerns about
immigrants draining the social welfare service system and taking jobs
away from U.S. citizens gave rise to an interest in more stringently
monitoring and eradicating the illegal alien population in the United
States. 3 As part of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"),
Congress passed the battered spouse provision, attempting to
reconcile its desires to address domestic violence and tighten
4
immigration laws.
Illegal immigrants are subject to removal procedures. However,
because of the harshness of deportation, Congress passed statutes
creating safe havens for aliens seeking to escape that fate. Aliens may
apply to the Attorney General for cancellation of removal in one of two
ways. First, and most commonly, aliens may invoke 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(b)(1)(D), which allows the Attorney General to cancel the
removal of an alien who "establishes that removal would result in
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's spouse,
parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence." 5 Litigation has settled
6
the boundaries of the "extreme hardship" provision.
Second, aliens may invoke the battered spouse provision.
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C.S. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(I), part of the Violence
Against Women Act, the Attorney General may cancel removal if an
alien proves that she "has been battered or subjected to extreme
7
cruelty by a spouse or parent who is or was a United States citizen."
See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25-27 (1993) (addressing the "rising tide of violence"
1.
directed against American women).
See Janet Calvo, A Decade of Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: Coverture's
2.
Diminishment, but Not Its Demise, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 153, 162-65 (2004).
3.
See S. REP. No. 104-249, at 2-4 (1996) (discussing the drain on social welfare created by
illegal immigration and the availability of jobs as the primary magnet for most illegal
immigrants). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2000)), was enacted in part to
monitor illegal immigration more stringently. See also Aaron G. Leiderman, Note, Preserving the
Constitution's Most Important Human Right: Judicial Review of Mixed Questions Under the
REAL ID Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2006) (calling the enactment of the IIRAIRA
Congress's "tough stand" on illegal immigration).
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. .1796, 1902
4.
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
5.
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2000).
6.
See infra Part V.A.
7.
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(I).
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An alien who applies for removal cancellation pursuant to this statute
will be granted a hearing before an Immigration Judge.8 The alien
may appeal the Immigration Judge's decision to the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), also within the agency. 9 However,
circuit courts have split as to whether a federal court may review the
BIA's determination that an alien has not been subjected to "extreme
cruelty."1 0
As a general matter, courts cannot review a "discretionary"
removal decision by the Attorney General.1 1 However, courts disagree
whether a finding of "extreme cruelty" constitutes a discretionary
decision. Most courts regard the determination that an alien's family
12
would suffer "extreme hardship" due to deportation as discretionary.
On the other hand, courts view the determination that a family
member "battered" an immigrant as a non-discretionary factual
decision reviewable by the courts.' 3 "Extreme cruelty" lies between
these two tests, and courts disagree as to whether it should be treated
as discretionary, and therefore non-reviewable, or non-discretionary,
and therefore reviewable. The courts' interpretation of "extreme
cruelty" is significant especially because it implicates domestic abuse
issues and the legal defense of battered woman syndrome.
In Hernandez v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit held that
determining whether an act constitutes "extreme cruelty" is a nondiscretionary decision.' 4 The Tenth and Fifth Circuits disagreed with
the Ninth Circuit, holding that "extreme cruelty" is a subjective
determination requiring balancing multiple factors. 15 These divergent
holdings reflect the courts' attitudes towards domestic violence and

8.
9.
10.

Id. § 1229a(a)(1).
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3) (2007).
See infra Part III.

11.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).

12. See, e.g., INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981) (holding that the Board of
Immigration Appeals, operating as a delegate of the Attorney General, acted within its authority
in construing the term "extreme hardship" under federal deportation provisions); Moosa v. INS,
171 F.3d 994, 1012-13 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the discretionary nature of an "extreme
hardship" interpretation precludes subsequent court review of that interpretation); Kalaw v.
INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the Attorney General's determination of
"extreme hardship" is "clearly a discretionary act").
13. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 834-35 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
determinations requiring the application of law to fact, including whether an immigrant has
been subjected to battery, are non-discretionary, and therefore reviewable by the courts).
14.

Id. at 834.

15. See Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 983 (10th Cir. 2005) (" '[E]xtreme
cruelty' is just the sort of non-algorithmic decision that requires a non-reviewable 'judgment call'
by the Attorney General."); see also Wilmore v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2006)
(describing and agreeing with the Tenth Circuit's characterization).
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opinions concerning how immigration law should respond to
allegations of abuse in the home. Although the Ninth Circuit errs on
the side of protecting a vulnerable demographic, the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits have chosen a solution that bolsters the efficiency of the
judicial system and helps prevent abuses of immigration law, even if it
may sometimes result in harsh application of an otherwise
ameliorative law. To resolve the conflict between the circuits, the
Supreme Court should consider holding that, although extreme
cruelty generally is a discretionary determination, there are certain
categories of "per se" abuses that, when present, render the decision
non-discretionary. The "per se" category would include cycles of
violence between spouses or between a parent and child. However, the
Court should leave cases involving verbal abuse or assault to the
Attorney General's discretion.
Part II of this Note discusses the history of agency immigration
decisions and the intersection of immigration law with domestic
violence concerns in the 1990s. It then discusses how these concerns
prompted Congress to add the battered spouse provision to the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994-an addition that led to the
current circuit split over whether "extreme cruelty" decisions should
be afforded judicial review. Part III of this Note analyzes the circuit
split, and Part IV proposes a compromise between the two all-ornothing approaches that the appellate courts have taken. Although
courts should view extreme cruelty decisions as generally
discretionary, certain per se categories of abuses should warrant
eliminating agency discretion, thus rendering these decisions
reviewable by the federal courts.
II.BACKGROUND

A. A History of Agency Immigration Decisions
Prior to 1996, the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")
entitled noncitizens to judicial review of any BIA deportation, as well
as any subsequent agency decision to deny deportation relief. 16 Parties
who wished to appeal a BIA decision "would file a petition for review

16. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 106(a) (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a
(repealed 1996)); see Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 50-52 (1955) (holding that enactment
of the INA rendered the Administrative Procedure Act's judicial review provisions applicable to
deportation decisions).
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in the court of appeals for the circuit in which the administrative
17
proceedings had been held."
In response to perceived abuses by immigrants trying to delay
deportation, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRAIRA"). 18 This legislation
narrowed dramatically the federal courts' jurisdiction to review final
deportation orders. 19 Section 106 of the INA, which formerly provided
for judicial review procedures, was replaced by section 242, later
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). 20 This new provision effectively
"vest[s] the BIA with final appellate jurisdiction for most Immigration
and Natrualization Service ("INS") deportation proceedings. ' 21 It does
so by prohibiting judicial review of any decision committed to the
Attorney General's discretion. 22 This legislation has left lower courts
confused as to whether other decisions by the Attorney General are
"discretionary."
In 2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act, which repealed
the writ of habeas corpus for noncitizens challenging agency removal
orders and replaced it with "what Congress believed to be a
constitutionally adequate alternative: direct circuit court review of
'constitutional claims or questions of law.' "23 However, the Act is
silent about whether mixed questions of law and fact are reviewable.
Therefore, in situations where the facts and the applicable legal
standard are undisputed, but there is a question as to whether the
standard was applied to the facts correctly, the REAL ID Act offers no
guidance as to whether federal courts have jurisdiction.

17. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1149; see INA § 106(a).
18. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104.
208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see Leiderman, supra
note 3 ("Congress has periodically adjusted the judicial review scheme for removal orders to rein
in perceived abuses of the system by non-citizens attempting to delay their removal from the
United States."). Congress also passed other legislation to toughen the country's stance on illegal
immigration, including section 440(a) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28,
40, and 42 U.S.C.), which "precluded from judicial review the final deportation orders of noncitizens deportable for certain criminal convictions." Leiderman, supra note 3, at 1370.
19. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1149 (noting the "specific repeal of the judicial review procedures"
previously available under INA § 106).
20. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 306, 110 Stat.
at 3009-607 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
21. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1149, 1152.
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) ("[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review [any decision]
the authority for which is specified ... to be in the discretion of the Attorney General .... ).
23. Leiderman, supra note 3, at 1367 (quoting REAL ID § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii) (as codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (amending INA § 242(a)(2)(D)))).
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B. The Intersection of ImmigrationLaw and Domestic Violence
Concerns
In the early 1990s, Congress began to increase its focus on the
problem of domestic violence in the United States. 24 Congress found
the problem's prevalence shocking:
In 1991, at least 21,000 domestic crimes were reported to the police every week; at least
1.1 million reported assaults-including aggravated assaults, rapes, and murders-were
committed against women in their homes that year; unreported domestic crimes have
been estimated to be more than three times this total.
Every week, during 1991, more than 2,000 women were raped, and more than 90
women were murdered-9 out of 10 by men. Women are six times more likely than men
to be the victim of a violent crime committed by an intimate; estimates indicate that
more than one of every six sexual assaults a week is committed by a family member.
Violence is the leading cause of injuries to women ages 15 to 44, more common than
automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer deaths combined. As many as 4 million
women a year are the victims of domestic violence. Three out of four women will be the
25
victim of a violent crime sometime during their life.

Moreover, the number of crimes against women was rapidly
increasing. A 1990 Senate Report found that over the previous 10
years, the number of reported rapes had risen four times faster than
the national crime rate. Over the previous fifteen years, assaults
against young women had risen fifty percent. 26 Although the victims of
domestic violence were overwhelmingly female (according to some
reports at the time, approximately 95% of victims of spousal abuse
were women), 27 the problem was not limited to one particular socio28
economic, racial, ethnic, or religious group.
Congress concluded that spousal abuse was a chronic problem,
national in scope, and affected not only women, but also children in
homes where domestic violence occurred, imposing heavy costs on
society. 29 Domestic violence contributes to homelessness, employee
absenteeism, and sick time. 30 Society also pays heavily for domestic
violence in health care costs. 31 Congressional Reports explored the role
of the law, law enforcement, and public attitudes in perpetuating

24. See Calvo, supra note 2, at 162-63 (noting Congress's recognition that "the legal system
historically failed to address violence against women with appropriate seriousness," and its
resolve that the nation's law "must change").
25. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37-38 (1993) (internal citations omitted).
26. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 30-31 (1990).
27. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26 (1993).
28. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 37.
29. Id. ("In homes where there is domestic violence, children are abused or seriously
neglected at a rate 1500 percent higher than the national average.").
30. Id.
31. S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 41-42 (1993).
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family violence. 32 Congress recognized that "the legal system has
historically failed to address violence against women with appropriate
33
seriousness, and has even accepted it as legitimate."
Later Congressional studies discovered that domestic violence
affected immigrant women at a much higher rate than the general
populace.3 4 In 1999, Congress found that in the United States, 34% to
49.8% of all immigrant women had been victims of domestic violence,
and approximately 59.5% of married immigrant women had been
abused. 35 Immigrant women often were dependent upon their spouses
to file petitions for residency and citizenship status. 36 Existing
immigration law fostered domestic violence by "placing control of the
alien spouse's ability to gain permanent legal status in the hands of
the spouse who was a citizen or legal permanent resident."3 7 A
battered spouse might not avail herself of help from government
resources for fear of deportation.3 8 In 1990, Congress passed an
amendment allowing an alien spouse to self-petition for conditional
residence status under certain circumstances-for example, if she had
suffered extreme cruelty, or if she would suffer extreme hardship if
deported. 39 The House Judiciary Committee Report stated that the
purpose of the change was to " 'ensure' that neither a spouse nor a
child would be 'entrapped in the abusive relationship by the threat of
losing their [sic] legal resident status.' "40
Congress ultimately passed the Violence Against Women Act of
1994 ("VAWA"), 4 1 "the first comprehensive federal legislation to
32. See id. at 42.
33. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 27 (1993).
34. Lauri J. Owen, Commentary, Forced Through the Cracks: Deprivation of the Violence
Against Women Act's Immigration Relief in San Francisco Bay Area Immigrant Domestic
Violence Survivors' Cases, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 13, 16 (2006) (citing Karyl Alice
Davis, Comment, Unlocking the Door by Giving Her the Key: A Comment on the Adequacy of the
U-visa as a Remedy, 56 ALA. L. REV. 557, 557 (2004)).
35. Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 3083 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 60
(2000) (statement of Leslye Orloff, Director, Immigrant Women Program, NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund).
36. Calvo, supra note 2, at 165.
37. Id. Moreover, the exceptions that allowed for an alien spouse to "self-petition" for
resident status were narrow. Id. at 156-57.
38. See id. at 165 ("A battered spouse could be deterred from taking action to protect
herself, such as filing for a civil protection order, filing criminal charges, or calling the police,
because of the threat or fear of deportation.").
39. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (2000) (listing three exceptions under which an alien spouse
could self-petition).
40. Calvo, supranote 2, at 167 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-723, pt. 1, at 51, 78 (1990)).
41. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
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address specifically the issue of violence against women." 42 This
sweeping litigation acknowledged the particular problems that
immigrant women faced in the home and included a subtitle called
"Protections for Battered Immigrant Women and Children."43 This
section allowed victims of domestic violence to petition to have their
deportation order excused if they had been battered or subjected to
extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent who is or was a citizen or lawful
permanent resident.44 In addition to proving extreme cruelty or
battery, the statute asked the petitioning alien to demonstrate: (1)
that she had been physically present in the United States for at least
three years immediately preceding the date of the application; (2) that
she was a person of good moral character during that period; and (3)
that removal would result in extreme hardship to herself, her child, or
45
her parent.
Congress did not define "extreme cruelty," compelling courts to
46
turn to the agency's definition in the Code of Federal Regulations.
That definition states that battery or extreme cruelty includes, but is
not limited to:
[B]eing the victim of any act or threatened act of violence, including any forceful
detention, which results or threatens to result in physical or mental injury.
Psychological or sexual abuse or exploitation, including rape, molestation, incest (if the
victim is a minor), or forced prostitution shall be considered acts of violence. Other
abusive actions may also be acts of violence under certain circumstances, including acts
that, in and of themselves,
may not initially appearviolent but that are part of an overall
47

pattern of violence.

Even though Congress enacted increasingly stringent
legislation in an effort to crack down on the illegal immigrant
population, the battered spouse provision has remained intact. For
example, Congress intended for the IIRAIRA of 1996 to toughen the
country's stance on illegal immigration as a whole, but Congress made
an effort to carve out exceptions for the domestically abused from the
harsh effects of the new legislation. 48 For example, the IIRAIRA
42. Deanna Kwong, Removing Barriers for Battered Immigrant Women: A Comparison of
Immigrant Protectionunder VAWA I & II, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 137, 137 (2002).
43. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, tit. IV, subtit. G, 108 Stat. at 1953; see also
Calvo, supranote 2, at 172-74 (discussing the section's reforms).
44. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)-(II).
45. Id. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i), (ii), (iii), (v).
46. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2003) (giving deference, in a
case concerning deportation, to an INS regulation defining the term "extreme cruelty").
47. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) (2007) (emphasis added).
48. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(l-V) (granting clemency to battered women and
children seeking readmission to the United States); id. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(ii) (exempting battered
women and children from the strictures of quotas for skilled and unskilled workers petitioning to
come into the country); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b)(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007) (allowing for
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classified a conviction for domestic violence as a deportable offense. 49
Additionally, the Violence Against Women Act of 2000 allowed for
even broader self-petitioning to make the battered spouse provision
50
more helpful and accessible to alien women.
C. Judicial Interpretationsof the Reviewability of the Battered Spouse
Provision
Although the battered spouse provision remains helpful to
immigrant women petitioning to stop deportation at the agency level,
the passage of IIRAIRA limited an alien's right to judicial review by
federal courts. The IIRAIRA eliminates judicial review of
discretionary decisions. 5 ' For aliens whose petition to stay deportation
is rejected by the BIA, it is critical to know whether the BIA's extreme
cruelty determination is discretionary or not. If the decision is
discretionary, then they are not entitled to judicial review. If it is nondiscretionary, then they are. The following Section examines the
circuit split on this issue and the various approaches courts have
taken.
The first appellate court to address the issue, the Ninth
Circuit, held that extreme cruelty was a non-discretionary decision
and granted review. In Hernandez v. Ashcroft, the petitioner alien
sought review of a BIA decision affirming the Immigration Judge's
refusal to suspend deportation under the battered spouse provision of
VAWA. 52 While living in Mexico, the petitioner, Laura Luis
Hernandez, had experienced life-threatening violence at the hands of
her husband, a legal permanent resident of the United States.5 3 She
fled to the United States, but her husband tracked her down, promised
54
not to hurt her again, and begged her to return to Mexico with him.
After Hernandez acquiesced and returned to Mexico, the physical

cancellation of a removal order for battered women and children); 8 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000)
(preventing the government from making adverse immigration decisions based solely on evidence
provided by batterers).
49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
50. See Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 2000 § 1503(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(BB) (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(BB)) (alleviating the battered petitioner's burden of proof that the
batterer was a U.S. citizen); see also Kwong, supra note 42, at 145-48 (providing an in-depth
analysis of Congress's attempt to make self-petitioning easier for battered women under VAWA
of 2000).
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
52. 345 F.3d 824, 831-32 (9th Cir. 2003).
53. Id. at 827.
54. Id. at 830.
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abuse began again. 55 Laura Hernandez escaped from her husband a
second time and lived in the United States without legal status until
the state arrested her and scheduled her deportation. 56 The
immigration judge denied her suspension of deportation application
because Hernandez could not show that she had been battered or
subjected to extreme cruelty "in the United States," as the statute
required.5 7 The BIA affirmed the decision; however, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the BIA, holding that Hernandez had been subjected to
extreme cruelty in the United States because she was in the "wellrecognized stage within the cycle of violence, one which is both
psychologically and practically crucial to maintaining the batterer's
control."5 8 Thus, the court held that she had suffered extreme cruelty
while in the United States. 59 The court noted that the determination of
extreme cruelty by the BIA was non-discretionary. 60 The court
explained that the decision whether a person was subject to extreme
cruelty is a clinical one, similar to whether or not someone is a
61
drunk.
Since Hernandez, two additional circuits, the Fifth and the
Tenth, faced the same question and reached the opposite conclusionthe Attorney
General's
extreme
cruelty
determination
is
discretionary. 62 In Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, the petitioner
claimed that her husband, a United States citizen, called her names,
used derogatory language, and raped her (though the BIA did not find
the rape claim credible). 63 The BIA denied her cancellation of removal
request, finding that she failed to show that her husband subjected
her to extreme cruelty. 64 The Tenth Circuit declined to hear the
petitioner's appeal of the BIA's extreme cruelty determination,
reasoning that it lacked jurisdiction to review a discretionary
decision. 65 The court held that the determination of whether a
particular decision of the agency is discretionary or not should be
made on a case-by-case basis. 66 Relying on Tenth Circuit case law, the

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 831.
Id. at 828 (emphasis supplied by the court).
Id.
Id. at 841.
Id. at 835.
Id. at 834.
The other circuit courts have yet to rule on this issue.
429 F.3d 977, 980-81 (10th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 980.
Id. at 981-84.
Id. at 982.
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court stated, "Decisions that involve a 'judgment call' by the agency, or
for which there is 'no algorithm' on which review may be based, are
extreme
considered discretionary." 67 According to the Tenth 6Circuit,
8
cruelty decisions are examples of such judgment calls.
Initially, the Fifth Circuit declined to decide whether extreme
cruelty determinations were discretionary. 69 In Garnica-Villarrealv.
Ashcroft, the petitioner, Garnica, petitioned for a cancellation of his
removal order, arguing that the parental neglect he suffered
constituted extreme cruelty. 70 The court avoided the issue by holding
that regardless of whether parental neglect constitutes "extreme
cruelty," the petitioner was not entitled to relief.7 1 The court reasoned
that any decision interpreting a phrase containing terms that were not
self-explanatory necessarily would be a discretionary determination
and thus outside of its jurisdiction. 72 On the other hand, if the terms
were self-explanatory, then the lower court did not err in finding that
parental neglect was not within the self-explanatory meaning of
extreme cruelty.7 3 The court implied that even if extreme cruelty is a
non-discretionary term, plaintiffs must meet a high threshold to
demonstrate "extreme cruelty."
The Fifth Circuit ultimately answered the question definitively
in its next case on the issue, Wilmore v. Gonzales. There, the court
held that a finding of "extreme cruelty" is discretionary because the
term is not self-explanatory and reasonable men could differ as to its
meaning.7 4 The BIA denied Wilmore's petition for cancellation of
removal pursuant to the battered spouse provision because she failed
to show that she had been subjected to extreme cruelty. 75 She
appealed this decision to the Fifth Circuit.7 6 Her case arose after
passage of the 2005 REAL ID Act, which guaranteed that any
question of law decided by the agency should be reviewable by federal
courts. 77 The Fifth Circuit, however, found that the provision had no
impact on the way that the court handled these cases and merely

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. (quoting Sabido Valdivia v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1144, 1149 (10th Cir. 2005)).
Id. at 982-83.
Garnica-Villarreal v. Ashcroft, 123 F. App'x 625, 626-27 (5th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 626.
Id. at 626-27.
Id.
Id.
455 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 526.
Id. at 525.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (Supp. V 2005).
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codified the court's previous existing practice. 78 The court held that it
lacked jurisdiction, considering the approaches of the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, but ultimately focusing (like the Tenth Circuit) on the
multiple and indistinct factors that must be considered when
determining whether certain conduct rises to the level of extreme
cruelty. 79 Because such a determination requires consideration of
many discrete factors, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the decision as
8 0
to whether extreme cruelty had occurred was discretionary.
III. ANALYSIS
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have split with the Ninth Circuit
over the reviewability of a determination that an alien petitioner has
been subjected to extreme cruelty. The Ninth Circuit, the first to
address the issue, held that it was a non-discretionary decision and
therefore reviewable.8 1 The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on new, but
increasingly accepted, theories of the psychology of domestic abuse
and referenced the intent of Congress in passing the battered spouse
provision.8 2 It therefore adopted a view of the issue that is more
favorable to the alien petitioner who, in most cases, is an abused
immigrant woman.
While the Fifth and Tenth Circuits had the benefit of the Ninth
Circuit's view when deciding the issue as a matter of first impression
in their respective circuits, the two circuits ultimately disagreed with
the Ninth. Both courts focused more on the text of the statute than the
Congressional intent underlying its passage. The Tenth Circuit,
however, emphasized the multiplicity of factors that a court should
consider, while the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the phrase "extreme
cruelty" was not self-explanatory, partly because so many factors
would have to be considered to ascertain its exact meaning. Both
Circuits agreed that the reasoning in the "extreme hardship cases"
(which is, in all but a few circumstances, a discretionary decision) is
persuasive in the context of the extreme cruelty cases.
A quick comparison of the decisions by the various circuit
courts reveals a split on the following issues:

78. See id. at 526-29 (discussing the consensus among the circuits that 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (2000 & Supp. V 2005), which otherwise strips the courts of jurisdiction to review
decisions regarding the granting of relief, does not curtail jurisdiction over purely legal
questions).
79. Id. at 528.
80. Id.
81. Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 834 (9th Cir. 2003).
82. See id. at 835-37.
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Position on
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Construction
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The Ninth Circuit:
Extreme Cruelty is
Non-discretionary and
Reviewable

The Fifth and Tenth
Circuits: Extreme Cruelty is
Discretionary and
Non-reviewable

Clinical determination,
objective as opposed to
subjective, and therefore
non-discretionary

Discretionary determination
because there is no algorithm,
many factors to consider, and
the phrase is not

Informed by new theories of
domestic violence

self-explanatory
More reluctant to utilize new
theories of domestic violence

Determinations that require
application of law to factual
determinations are non-

Determinations that require
application of law to factual
determinations are

discretionary
Ameliorative rules should be
interpreted and applied in
an ameliorative fashion
Distinguishes the "extreme
hardship" line of cases

discretionary
No mention of lenient canons of
construction

Extremely sympathetic facts

Applies the reasoning of
"extreme hardship" cases to
extreme cruelty cases
Less sympathetic facts

This Part will analyze the two differing approaches circuit
courts have taken in addressing the reviewability of extreme cruelty
decisions. It will then evaluate the decisions in the context of
Congressional action and intent, and compare cases on extreme
cruelty to those on the similar issue of extreme hardship in an attempt
to shed some light on the meaning of extreme cruelty.
A. The Ninth Circuit:Non-discretionaryand Reviewable
1. Reliance upon Battered Woman Syndrome

The Ninth Circuit was the first court to consider whether an
extreme cruelty finding is discretionary, and its analysis of the issue
remains the most thoroughly reasoned. The Ninth Circuit dealt with
extremely sympathetic facts in Hernandez. The court carefully
documented the horrific abuses that the petitioner suffered at the
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hands of her husband. If ever Congress had in mind a battered
woman, it was the petitioner, Laura Luis Hernandez. The court
described her husband's brutal attacks with great particularity in the
opinion. His abuses included breaking a chair over her head, attacking
her with a knife, badly cutting her hand when she tried to block his
83
attempt to stab her, smashing a fan over her head, and beating her.
The court noted that his refusal to let her seek medical attention and
his attempts to lock her in the house after the attacks led to
84
complications from her injuries, including permanent nerve damage.
The court also mentioned that Hernandez carries scars on her head
and hand, and that her hand is permanently disabled and in constant
pain from the knife attack.8 5 These episodes of violence devolved into a
pattern: petitioner would try to escape, sometimes successfully, and
her husband would persuade her to return with expressions of regret
86
and promises of better behavior, only to repeat his physical abuse.
Despite her suffering, testimony about which the Immigration
Judge found credible, the BIA decided she had not satisfied the
extreme cruelty requirement because she had not been subject to any
87
attacks by her husband while she was in the United States.
Hernandez would flee to the United States, become scared that her
husband would find her, and then return to Mexico with her husband
when he acted in a conciliatory manner.8 8 Thus, the court concluded
that because Hernandez's husband did not physically abuse her in the
United States, she should be denied relief from deportation.
The extremity of these facts helps to explain why the Ninth
Circuit decided the case as it did. The most striking element of the
Ninth Circuit's decision is that the court classified extreme cruelty as
non-discretionary, finding that such a determination was clinical in
nature.8 9 The court noted, "[U]ltimately, the question of whether an
individual has experienced domestic violence in either its physical or
psychological manifestation is a clinical one, akin to the issue of
whether an alien is a 'habitual drunkard.' "90 The decision does not
rest on how a person acts or how others act toward that person; it
rests on an assessment of the person's state of being, which is merely
informed by how the person acts.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 829-30.
at 830-31.
at 829-31.
at 827, 829.
at 829-30.
at 834.
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The court's use of the word "clinical" and its analogy to
alcoholism imply that the court views the extreme cruelty decision as
a diagnosis. For example, a doctor can diagnose a person as an
alcoholic. It is a clinical, chemical diagnosis of a disease. The body may
become physically dependent on alcohol, which indisputably
distinguishes an alcoholic from a social drinker. 91 Reasoning by
analogy, the court's interpretation implies that a court could
"diagnose" the state of having suffered extreme cruelty in a domestic
violence context.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion reflects the judicial system's
growing incorporation of new understandings about the consequences
of repeated domestic violence. 92 The Ninth Circuit accepted the theory
that "[a]buse within intimate relationships often follows a pattern
known as the cycle of violence." 93 This cycle "consists of a tension
building phase, followed by acute battering of the victim, and finally
by a contrite phase where the batterer's use of promises and gifts
increases the battered woman's hope that violence has occurred for the
last time."94 The court also adopted the view that "although a
relationship may appear to be predominantly tranquil and punctuated
only infrequently by episodes of violence, abusive behavior does not
occur as a series of discrete events, but rather pervades the entire
relationship. '9 5 The court concluded that abuse is not confined to the
minutes, hours, or days where physical or verbal abuse actually
occurs; it creates a cloud of fear and control over the victim that is
constant and continuous such that the abuse, though it may appear
episodic, "can be viewed as a single and continuing entity." 96
The court cited scholarship addressing battered woman
syndrome, a prominent theory of domestic abuse, to support its

91. See Mental Health-Alcoholism, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/alcoholism/DS00340
(last visited Nov. 9, 2007) (discussing physical dependence on alcohol as a characteristic of
alcoholism); see also Cynthia Mascott, An Introduction to Alcoholism (Oct. 4, 2006),
http://psychcentral.com/lib/2006/alcoholism-and-its-treatment
(distinguishing social drinkers
from alcoholics on the basis of physical dependence).
92. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE ET AL., NCJ 160972, THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE
CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT RESPONDING TO SECTION
40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT ix (1996) (finding that expert testimony on

battering and its effects is admissible, at least to some degree, in each of the fifty states plus the
District of Columbia, with three quarters of the states allowing such testimony to prove that a
woman is a battered woman).
93. Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 836.
94. Id. (quoting Mary Ann Dutton, UnderstandingWomen's Responses to Domestic Violence:
A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1208 (1993)).

95.
96.

Id. at 836-37 (quoting Dutton, supra note 94).
Id. at 837 (quoting Dutton, supra note 94).
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expansive understanding of domestic violence. 97 The scholarship notes
that battered woman syndrome occurs in the three stages outlined
above: tension, battering, and contrition.9 8 Additionally, the theory
posits that a woman suffering from the syndrome subjectively believes
that she is unable to leave her husband because he will harm her if
she does, though to others it may appear that escape is possible. 99
Defendants use battered woman syndrome as a defense against
manslaughter charges. 100 In that context, it is used to show that an
abused woman reasonably believes that she is in constant danger and
is acting in self-defense when she kills her abusive partner, though he
may not actively be harming her when the retributive violence
occurs. 101
Despite reference to scholarship on the topic, the Ninth Circuit
never uses the term "battered woman syndrome" in the Hernandez
opinion. Though the court's medical terminology seems to reference
battered woman syndrome, the court neither cites the syndrome
specifically nor argues that Hernandez suffered from it. Battered
woman syndrome remains controversial, 10 2 and though many courts
accept the theory' 03-most famously to support a self-defense claim in
homicide cases 1 4-it is not a universally accepted legal defense. That
97. See Bess Rothenberg, The Success of the Battered Woman Syndrome: An Analysis of
How Cultural Arguments Succeed, 17 SOC. F. 81, 81 (2002) (calling battered woman syndrome
the "most recognized explanation for why abusive relationships continue").
98. See LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55-70 (1980) (discussing the three stages
and the repetitive nature of the cycle).
99. See id. at 42-54 (discussing the psychosocial theory of learned helplessness, in which
battered women learn and believe over time that no matter what their reaction to the violence is,
the battery will not stop, even though to others it seems like the women could escape).
100. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 368 (N.J. 1984) (determining that expert
testimony regarding battered woman syndrome is admissible to help establish a claim of selfdefense in a homicide case).
101. See id. at 375-77 (discussing the relevance of expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome in establishing the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that she was in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury).
102. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 92, at iv, x (1996) (noting the common criticism
of the defense as "tantamount to an acquittal"); Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 70-87 (1994) (criticizing battered woman syndrome as patriarchal and hurtful to women);
David L. Faigman, Note, Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical
Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 622 (1986) (arguing against the admission of expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome to support a self-defense claim); Norman J. Finkel, Haute Couture,
Poorly Tailored Crimes, and Ill-Fitting Verdicts, 10 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLy 173, 183-208
(2003) (debating the proper legal use of battered woman syndrome).
103. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 92 (finding that over three quarters of the states
have found expert testimony admissible to prove the defendant is a battered woman).
104. For one of the first and most well known cases allowing expert testimony about battered
woman syndrome to support a claim of self-defense in a homicide case, see Kelly, 478 A.2d at 368.
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the Ninth Circuit avoided the term "battered woman syndrome"
implies that the court did not want to base its "extreme cruelty"
determination upon a controversial theory. The court incorporates the
understanding of the pattern of violence and continuous psychological
entrapment that comes from battered woman syndrome literature, but
does not seek to limit the ability of women to introduce evidence of
these psychological effects if they are not diagnosed officially with the
syndrome but have suffered from similar patterns of domestic
10 5
abuse.
Thus, by omitting an explicit reference to battered woman
syndrome, the court avoids using a controversial term and thus eases
the evidentiary burden for a petitioner claiming domestic violence. Not
all women subjected to extreme cruelty suffer from battered woman
syndrome specifically. Moreover, a petitioning alien woman may lack
the resources to hire a psychiatrist to testify in an agency hearing that
she suffers from battered woman syndrome. By shying away from the
"syndrome" while endorsing the theories underlying it, the court eases
the evidentiary burden of the petitioning alien woman. Such a position
is in line with Congress's intent (examined in the following Section)
that petitioning alien women claiming domestic abuse should be
subject to a lower evidentiary burden,10 6 because crimes such as
marital rape and violence inside the home are notoriously difficult to
prove.
2. Legislative Intent and Purpose
The Ninth Circuit was not alone in incorporating controversial
theories of domestic violence into the law: it followed Congress's
example. In Hernandez, the court looked to the Congressional intent
underlying VAWA and to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") regulation defining battery and extreme cruelty in the context

105. Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 836 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing scholarship pertaining
to battered woman syndrome, including Mary Ann Dutton, supra note 94, and Evan Stark, RePresenting Women Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L.
REV. 973, 985-86 (1995)). The court's refusal to limit itself by using the term "battered woman
syndrome" is consistent with a report from the Department of Justice, which found a "strong
consensus among the researchers, and also among the judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys
interviewed for the assessment, that the term 'battered woman syndrome' does not adequately
reflect the breadth or nature of the scientific knowledge now available concerning battering and
its effects." DEP'T OF JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 92, at i-ii.
106. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(J) (2000) (applying the "any credible evidence" standard to
aliens making allegations of abuse by a U.S. citizen).
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of VAWA self petitions.1 0 7 The court determined that both Congress
and the INS meant to liberalize the legal understanding of domestic
violence in federal law.1 08 These bodies intended to remedy past
governmental insensitivity and integrate new understandings of
domestic violence into the new statute and regulations. 10 9
The Ninth Circuit referenced Congress's understanding of
domestic violence when passing VAWA in an attempt to discern what
kinds of behavior Congress believed constituted extreme cruelty. 110
The Act's legislative history suggests that Congress intended courts to
approach domestic violence progressively in order to combat
misconceptions surrounding domestic violence and our culture's long
disregard of violence against women."1 Congress recognized that "lay
understandings of domestic violence are frequently comprised of
'myths, misconceptions, and victim blaming attitudes,' and that
background information regarding domestic violence may be crucial in
order
to
understand
its
essential
characteristics
and
1 2
manifestations." 1
Legislative
history
further
demonstrates
Congress's understanding that "current [immigration] law fosters
domestic violence.""13 As a result, Congress intended that courts
interpret VAWA to "remedy the widespread gender bias and ignorance
that have resulted in governmental harm, rather than help, for
14
survivors of domestic violence.""
The regulation promulgated by the INS that defines 'battery
and extreme cruelty" together adopts a broad understanding of
domestic violence, including battered woman syndrome. The
Hernandez court conceded that the statutory terms at issue, "battery"
and "extreme cruelty," are ambiguous, and therefore the court
accorded the agency definition Chevron deference.1 1 5 The court focused
107. See Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 838-40 (noting that no court had yet interpreted the
meaning of "extreme cruelty," and therefore looking to principles of statutory construction,
legislative history, and agency interpretation).
108. See id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 26 (1993), which enumerates Congress's intent
that VAWA be interpreted to remedy the effects of past gender bias and ignorance to survivors of
domestic violence).
109. See id. at 827, 838-40 (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 26, and noting that the INS
definition of extreme cruelty carries out congressional intent and complies with clinical
understandings of domestic violence).
110. Id. at 836, 838-39.
111. See H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 22-24 (advocating that judges receive training to handle
cases involving domestic abuse more effectively, given the history of insufficient law enforcement
efforts in domestic abuse cases).
112. Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 836 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 24).
113. H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 26.
114. Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 838-39 (citing H.R. REP.. No. 103-395, at 26).
115. Id. at 839.
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particularly on INS language noting that "other abusive actions may
also be acts of violence under certain circumstances, including acts
that, in and of themselves, may not initially appear violent but that
are part of an overall pattern of violence." 116 Citing the canon of
construction that a statute should be read to avoid redundancy, the
court concluded that "extreme cruelty" is a broad enough term to
encompass nonphysical aspects of domestic violence, as well as
physical ones.1 1 7 Moreover, the court held that claims should be
evaluated in the context of domestic violence theory, such that acts of
conciliation, which on the surface may not appear violent, are viewed
as an integral part of the cycle of violence and contrition that
psychologically controls and traps victims." 8 Thus, the court
concluded that, like Congress, the INS intended for courts to interpret
"extreme cruelty" broadly. 19
Of course, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that "extreme cruelty"
should be interpreted broadly does not itself indicate whether the
"extreme cruelty" decision was intended to be discretionary or nondiscretionary. However, in the opinion of the Ninth Circuit, Congress's
intent to broaden domestic violence and extreme cruelty to include a
pattern or cycle of violence makes the term "extreme cruelty" an
objective, rather than a subjective, determination. 20 Extreme cruelty,
therefore, like its partner "battery," becomes an objective, nondiscretionary determination.' 2 ' Battery is a straightforward factual
finding. A determination that someone is trapped within a cycle of
violence is a similarly objective finding. Objective determinations, by
definition, are non-discretionary.
A finding that extreme cruelty occurred is thus a mixed
question of law and fact. The fact-finder first must determine what the
facts are, then must apply the law to decide whether extreme cruelty
occurred. In assessing whether a particular element is discretionary or
non-discretionary, the Ninth Circuit considered a number of factors,
including whether the question is one of law or fact, or is a mix of the

116. Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) (2007)).
117. Id. at 838.
118. Id. at 836-37, 840.

119. Id. at 840.
120. Id. at 834, 839-40 (combining "Congress's goal of protecting battered immigrant women"
and the "clinical understanding of domestic violence" to conclude that patterns of extreme
violence constitute, objectively, "extreme cruelty").
121. See id. at 833-34 (discussing Congress's inclusion of "battery" and "extreme cruelty" as
alternatives of one another, and acknowledging the "clearly factual determination" that applies
to questions of battery).
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two. 122 The court noted that determinations that require application of
law to factual determinations are non-discretionary. 123 For example,
the requirement that an alien be able to demonstrate a continuous
physical presence in the United States is a non-discretionary mixed
question of law and fact, similar to extreme cruelty because it "must
124
be determined from the facts, not through an exercise of discretion."'
Unfortunately, it remains unclear whether the Ninth Circuit believes
that all mixed questions of law and fact are non-discretionary.
The court distinguished "extreme cruelty" determinations from
"extreme hardship" determinations, which it held were discretionary
25
in a previous case, Kalaw v. Immigration & Naturalization Service.
Hernandez found that hardship and cruelty are fundamentally
different in nature. 126 Like good moral character, hardship is by
nature a discretionary determination that guides the INS in "its
limitation of a scarce and coveted status to those applicants deemed
particularly worthy."' 127 By contrast, extreme cruelty is, like duration
of physical presence, a "threshold inquiry into whether an individual
possesses the minimum attributes necessary to qualify for certain
128
types of relief."
Finally, the Ninth Circuit characterized the battered spouse
provision as "a generous enactment, intended to ameliorate the impact
of harsh provisions of immigration law on abused women."' 29 It
reasoned that because of this generosity, its liberal interpretation of
extreme cruelty, which strongly favors petitioners in allowing them
both to meet the extreme cruelty requirement and to obtain
meaningful judicial review in the federal courts, was justified.' 30 The
court therefore applied the general rule of construction that "when the
legislature enacts an ameliorative rule designed to forestall harsh
results, the rule will be interpreted and applied in an ameliorative
fashion," finding such an interpretive presumption particularly
122. Id. at 833-34.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 834 (quoting Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1997)).
125. Id. at 833-34 (discussing Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1151).
126. Id. at 835.
127. Id.
128. Id. The Ninth Circuit also engaged in statutory construction in order to distinguish
"extreme hardship" and "extreme cruelty." The court cited a provision, now repealed, which
specifically left extreme hardship provisions to the Attorney General: "a person whose
deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship." Id. at
834-35 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1), 1254(a)(3), repealed by IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009 (1997)).
129. Id. at 840.
130. Id.
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applicable in the immigrant context, "where doubts are to be resolved
in favor of the alien. 1 3 1
3. Limitations to the Ninth Circuit's Approach
The Ninth Circuit unfortunately does not elaborate on the
multiplicity of factors that must be considered before making the
determination of whether or not one is caught in a cycle of violence. It
is more difficult to look at a pattern of domestic violence and call it
"extreme cruelty" than to look at a punch to the face and call it
"battery."
The court also left several other questions unanswered. It did
not address whether extreme cruelty may be found only when the
cycle of violence (and therefore psychological abuse) occurs between a
man and woman who are partners, or the theory would also extend to
nonromantic relationships, such as parent and child (a relationship in
which there is no similarly accepted theory about patterns of domestic
violence). Furthermore, the court did not address whether simple
verbal abuse can constitute extreme cruelty, or physical abuse of some
sort is necessary. Although the facts of Hernandez made these
determinations unnecessary, courts deciding such issues in the future
have little guidance to interpret the term "extreme cruelty" outside of
the realm of physical abuse between spouses.
B. The Tenth and Fifth Circuits: Discretionaryand Non-reviewable
The Tenth and Fifth the Circuits, in decisions published after
Hernandez, both held that extreme cruelty determinations are
committed to the discretion of the Attorney General, and therefore
federal courts cannot review these decisions. 132 The Tenth and the
Fifth Circuits highlight the statute's textual ambiguity and give short
shrift to the legislative history of VAWA and the intent underlying the
Act. Additionally, both courts appear reluctant to accept theories of
domestic violence, such as the cycle of violence and contrition that
provides the context in which to analyze actions alleged to constitute
domestic violence. These circuits emphasize the statute's text without
reference to Congress's intent or modern domestic abuse theory and
thus interpret the battered spouse provision narrowly.

131. Id. (quoting United States v. Sanchez-Guzman, 744 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (E.D. Wash.
1990)).

132. See Wilmore v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2006); Perales-Cumpean v.
Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 981-82 (10th Cir. 2005).
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1. The Tenth Circuit: No Algorithm to Apply
The Tenth Circuit, in Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, held that
extreme cruelty determinations are discretionary and therefore not
reviewable. 133 The facts in that case were not as dramatic as those in
Hernandez. In Perales, the petitioner alleged extreme cruelty arising
from insults, name-calling, and the use of derogatory language by her
husband.134 Moreover, because the Immigration Judge did not find the
petitioner's claim of marital rape credible, there was no viable battery
claim. 135 Thus, the court faced the question of whether merely verbal
abuse amounted to extreme cruelty. The court held that because there
was no algorithm to determine when actions rose to that level, the
Attorney General's decision should be viewed as discretionary:
[The decision whether the verbal abuse in a given case constitutes "extreme cruelty" is
just the sort of non-algorithmic decision that requires a non-reviewable "judgment call"
by the Attorney General. There is no hard-and-fast rule to distinguish "extreme cruelty"
136
from other, less severe, forms of cruel behavior.

The court found that, in this way, extreme cruelty
determinations are akin to "extreme hardship" decisions. 137 The Tenth
Circuit previously had announced that "extreme hardship" decisions
were discretionary because "there is no algorithm for determining
when a hardship is 'exceptional and extremely unusual.' "138 Extreme
hardship is a judgment call, and the court found the same to be true of
extreme cruelty. 139 There is no formula to determine whether a given
set of acts constitutes extreme cruelty; rather, the agency must
advance the purposes of the statute and exercise its discretion
accordingly. 140
The Tenth Circuit noted that Congress chose not to define
extreme cruelty. The court interpreted this Congressional silence as
deliberate. Congress could have specified the standard under which
verbal abuse would qualify as extreme cruelty, or it could have taken a
more categorical approach and excluded verbal abuse from the
definition of extreme cruelty altogether. 14 1 Because it did neither,
Congress must have expected the Attorney General to make

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

429 F.3d at 981-82.
Id. at 981.
Id. at 980.
Id. at 983.
Id. at 982.
Id. (quoting Morales Ventura v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 2003)).
Id. at 982-83.
Id. at 982.
Id. at 982-83.
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individualized decisions in defining the term on a case-by-case
basis.142
The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that the INS's
definition of "battery and extreme cruelty" is sufficiently specific and
clear to render the terms unambiguous. It found that the INS did not
143
define extreme cruelty specifically enough to provide an algorithm.
The INS definition does not determine whether the petitioner's
husband's "anger, jealousy, violent looks, verbal abuse, name calling,
and making very derogatory remarks in front of the petitioner's
friends and neighbors ... qualified as 'threatened acts of violence that
resulted or threatened to result in physical or mental injury' for
purposes of the regulation."'' 44 In addition, it did not provide insight
into whether the psychological trauma that the petitioner might suffer
because of this verbal abuse is sufficient to rise to the level of extreme
cruelty that stems from the acts mentioned in the definition: rape,
1 45
molestation, incest, and forced prostitution.
The Tenth Circuit made no mention of importing the algorithm
derived from traditional models of battered woman syndrome to
decipher the meaning of extreme cruelty within the context of
domestic violence, despite its knowledge that the Ninth Circuit did
so. 146 It gave no reason for this omission, but one possibility is that it
did not bring up these ideas because the facts in this case do not
suggest that a model derived from battered woman syndrome would
apply to the petitioner. She suffered no pattern of physical violence,
widely cited as a necessary element of -battered woman syndrome, but
only a pattern of verbal abuse.1 47 Essentially, the abuse alleged did not
rise to the level of abuse that suggests battered woman syndrome.
This difference in fact pattern makes clear why the court found the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Hernandez unpersuasive. Although the
Ninth Circuit held that patterns of physical abuse would render the
extreme cruelty decision non-discretionary, it left ambiguous whether
cases of lesser abuse, such as purely verbal abuse, would be nondiscretionary as well.

142. Id. at 983.
143. Id. at 984.
144. Id. (quoting the petitioner's brief and the INS definition, 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi)
(2007)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 983 (citing Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2003)).
147. See id. at 981 (noting that the petitioner's testimony concerning marital rape was not
credible, and that otherwise she only alleged abuse that consisted of "insults, name calling, and
use of derogatory language").
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Moreover, the Tenth Circuit highlighted that Congress did not
exempt the battered spouse provision from the jurisdiction-stripping
provision (which deprives federal courts of judicial review where the
agency's determination is discretionary). 148 Congress could have
exempted the battered spouse provision and did do so for other
provisions, such as discretionary decisions on asylum applications. 14 9
For this reason, the Tenth Circuit refused to consider the liberal
Congressional purpose in enacting VAWA (and, perhaps because of
this, it neglected to mention any of the lenient canons of construction
employed by the Ninth Circuit).150 However, the court did not give a
reason for linking an omission to exempt the battered spouse provision
from the jurisdiction-stripping provision with a refusal to consider the
purpose behind VAWA. The court seemed to imply that had Congress
wanted battered women to seek appellate review, it would have
provided for it specifically by vesting federal courts with the ability to
review the agency's extreme cruelty determination.
However, the court fails to address the ample legislative
history that suggests that Congress intended VAWA to protect
petitioning victims to an extraordinary degree. 151 Moreover, if
Congress considered the extreme cruelty decision non-discretionary in
the first place, the argument that Congress should have explicitly
provided for judicial review of the extreme cruelty decision is
inapplicable; it already is exempted from the jurisdiction-stripping
provision.
2. The Fifth Circuit: Not Self-Explanatory
The latest circuit court to address this issue, the Fifth Circuit,
in Wilmore v. Gonzales, agreed with the Tenth Circuit, holding that
extreme cruelty was discretionary and therefore not a reviewable
decision.1 52 Significantly, the court's recitation of facts downplays the
petitioner's abuse by phrasing it in abstract terms, casting doubt on
the merit of her claim. For example, the Fifth Circuit did not list
specifically the acts that Wilmore alleged constituted extreme cruelty;
148. See id. at 983 (analyzing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
149. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (2000) (limiting judicial review of determinations made by
the Attorney General under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2) regarding asylum applications); Wilmore v.
Gonzales, 455 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2006) (interpreting the interaction between the provisions
in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2), the "jurisdiction-stripping provision," and 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2), the
"battered spouse provision").
150. 429 F.3d at 983.
151. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's use of the legislative history of VAWA, see supra
Part III.A.1.b.
152. Wilmore, 455 F.3d at 528.
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the court simply mentioned that she alleged that her citizen husband
had subjected her to a "pattern of mental and psychological abuse"
(apparently, Wilmore made no claim of physical abuse ).153 The court
briefly noted that Wilmore's husband filed for an adjustment in status
to that of a lawful permanent resident on her behalf, withdrew the
petition, filed for divorce, and then filed and withdrew her adjustment
petition again. 15 4 At Wilmore's hearing, the Immigration Judge told
her that she might try to obtain a grant of removal cancellation, after
which she obtained counsel and filed for cancellation of removal
1 55
pursuant to the battered spouse provision.
The Fifth Circuit analyzed how 8 U.S.C.S. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
(VAWA) and the REAL ID Act interplay, such that the "Court lacks
jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions under section 1229b(b),"
the battered spouse provision, "but retains jurisdiction over purely
legal and non-discretionary decisions. 1 56 The court concluded that the
1 57
extreme cruelty decision is discretionary and not a legal question.
Thus, there is no review afforded the alien petitioner in the federal
courts.
The court reasoned that viewing the extreme cruelty decision
as discretionary is supported by the definition of "extreme cruelty" in
the federal regulations, the persuasive reasoning of the Tenth Circuit,
and the Fifth Circuit's own precedent.1 5 8 The court agreed with the
Tenth Circuit decision of Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales that the
equivocal language used by the INS when defining extreme cruelty
suggested that the decision was discretionary: "Considerable
discretion also is provided by the definition's phrases 'includes, but is
not limited to' and 'may ... be acts of violence under certain
circumstances.' ",159 It also endorsed the Tenth Circuit's judgment that
extreme cruelty determinations involved more than "simply plugging
facts into a formula," instead requiring judgments that implicated the
purposes of the statute.160
The Fifth Circuit also relied upon its own precedent in
"extreme hardship" cases, which holds that extreme hardship is a
discretionary decision because it is "not self-explanatory, and
153. Id. at 527-28.
154. Id. at 525-26.
155. Id. at 526.
156. Id. (quoting Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 215-16 (5th Cir. 2003)).
157. Id. at 528-29.
158. Id. at 528.
159. Id. (quoting Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 984 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting
the INS definition of "extreme cruelty" defined in 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi))).
160. Id. (quoting Perales-Cumpean,429 F.3d at 982).
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reasonable men could easily differ as to [its] construction."'16' Without
further reasoning, the court found that the term "extreme cruelty" is
likewise not self-explanatory and that reasonable individuals could
differ as to its meaning. 16 2 The court engaged in no further analysis
explaining why courts should view extreme hardship and extreme
cruelty similarly.
Like the Tenth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit also concluded that
the REAL ID Act did not affect whether extreme cruelty is reviewable
because such a decision is not a legal question. The REAL ID Act
provides that questions of law decided by agencies are reviewable in
federal courts.'6 3 The court determined that the case at issue did not
raise a legal question, and therefore the REAL ID Act did not provide
64
jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination of extreme cruelty.'
However, the court did not mention whether the extreme cruelty
determination was purely a question of fact or else a mixed question of
fact and law, nor how it treats such questions for the purposes of
judicial review.
The Fifth Circuit's cursory reasoning relies heavily on the
Tenth Circuit's decision. However, Wilmore emphasizes that the term
"extreme cruelty" is not self-explanatory, and therefore it must be
discretionary. The brevity of the court's reasoning likely is a result of
the weakness of the petitioner's claim that generic "abuse" was
"extreme cruelty."
IV. SOLUTION

Though the Tenth and Fifth Circuits seem to disagree with the
Ninth Circuit over whether a finding of "extreme cruelty" is a
discretionary decision, the opinions can be reconciled. Should the
Supreme Court grant writ, the Court should hold that extreme cruelty
is a discretionary decision, except in cases where the plaintiff meets
certain threshold factors. Because of reduced evidentiary burdens on
petitioners claiming domestic violence and in light of the ameliorative
intent of the battered spouse provision, a court should view a
plaintiffs claims of cyclical violence as non-discretionary. However, if
the plaintiff makes less egregious claims, or claims that require

161. Id. at 527 (quoting Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1013 (5th Cir. 1999)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 528-29 (explaining that "the Real ID Act removes jurisdictional bars to direct
review of questions of law in final removal, deportation, and exclusion orders" (citing INA §
242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (Supp. V 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
164. Id. at 529.
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consideration of many factors (such as purely verbal abuse or assault),
the decision should be discretionary and non-reviewable.
This solution can be analogized to the common law's resolution
of "extreme hardship" determinations. For the most part, "extreme
hardship" determinations are discretionary. However, in certain rare
cases, where the determination depends on non-discretionary factors,
the decision itself is said to be non-discretionary and therefore
reviewable by the federal courts.
A. Analogizing to Extreme Hardship Cases
"Extreme hardship" cases can inform the interpretation of
"extreme cruelty" because both terms are bases for cancellation of
deportation. In addition, courts have looked to the more-litigated
extreme hardship cases to inform their interpretation of extreme
cruelty. The "extreme hardship" determination is discretionary, with
notable exceptions. 165 Extreme hardship allows for cancellation of
deportation if the alien (1) has been physically present in the United
States for a continuous period of not less than ten years immediately
preceding the date of such application; (2) proves that during such
period he has been a person of good moral character; (3) has no
convictions under certain statutes; and (4) can show exception and
extremely unusual hardship to a spouse, parent, or child who is a U.S.
citizen or lawful permanent resident. 166 As compared to the extreme
cruelty determination, which requires petitioners to be present in the
United States continuously for three years, the extreme hardship
determination requires petitioners to be present ten years. 167 An
earlier version of the extreme hardship provision explicitly committed
the determination of extreme hardship to "the opinion of the Attorney
General."1 68 However, Congress repealed that section by IIRAIRA in
1 69
1996, and the current version contains no such language.

165. See Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(o, certain categories of individuals, "including habitual drunkards... [and] anyone who at
any time has been convicted of an aggravated felony," are per se considered not to have the good
moral character required under the extreme hardship provision).
166. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b)(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
167. Compare U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring nonpermanent residents seeking
cancellation of removal under the extreme hardship provision to have been physically present in
the United States for ten years), with id. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring only three years of
physical presence in the United States for nonpermanent residents seeking cancellation of
removal under the extreme cruelty provision).
168. INA § 244(a)(1) (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (repealed 1996)).
169. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b)(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007). IIRAIRA also increased the
physical presence requirement from seven years to ten, added the "no convictions" requirement,
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Nonetheless, courts continue to look to this original language as
evidence that Congress intended "extreme hardship" to be
discretionary.
Examination of the other necessary elements of the extreme
hardship provision sheds some light on how a decision that is
discretionary can, at times, become non-discretionary. For example,
"good moral character" is, by default, a decision appropriately left to
the Attorney General's discretion because it is "almost necessarily a
subjective question, dependent as it is upon the identity of the person
or entity examining the issue."170 However, Congress created certain
per se categories that, if applicable, render the good moral character
decision non-discretionary. For example, if a person has testified
falsely to obtain benefits under the INA or has been convicted of an
aggravated felony, he is not per se of good character. 171 If the BIA
finds that a person falls within one of these enumerated categories, it
lacks the discretion to grant the suspension of deportation application
because the person is per se not of good moral character and cannot
satisfy all the requirements of the "extreme hardship" provision. As
the Ninth Circuit stated in Kalaw, "[D]etermination of per se
ineligibility is not a discretionary matter. Consequently, direct judicial
review is available under the transitional rules of a BIA denial of
eligibility for suspension of deportation based on application of the per
se exclusion categories."172 Thus, although "good moral character" is
usually a discretionary term, it can become non-discretionary (and
therefore reviewable by the court) if it is based on certain factors
173
enumerated by Congress.
Additionally, two elements of the hardship determination are
always non-discretionary: the physical presence requirement 174 and

and made the alien show "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" instead of just "extreme
hardship." Overall, the IIRAIRA made it more difficult to win a reprieve under this provision.
See INA § 244(a)(1) (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (repealed 1996)) (detailing the
previous requirements for an alien to qualify for cancellation of deportation pursuant to the
extreme hardship provision.)
170. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1151; see also Torres-Guzman v. INS, 804 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir.
1986) ("[A] statutory direction to determine the presence or absence of good moral character
requires the fact finder to weigh and balance the favorable and unfavorable facts or factors,
reasonably bearing on character, that are present in the evidence.").
171. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(f).
172. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1151.
173. See Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2005) (denying a motion to dismiss
petitions under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) because a BIA decision holding that a petitioner was
precluded from establishing that he was a person of "good moral character" under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(f) is reviewable).
174. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2000).
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the no-convictions requirement. 175 Such determinations are based on
objective, independently confirmable facts. If an alien is denied relief
because he or she failed to meet either of these requirements, judicial
review is always available because these are non-discretionary
decisions. 176
Therefore, under the "extreme hardship" provision, there are
two elements that are always non-discretionary (physical presence
and lack of convictions), one element that is always discretionary
(extreme hardship), and one element that is usually discretionary, but
can be non-discretionary if the decision is based on facts that Congress
has deemed per se non-discretionary (good moral character).
B. Applying the Extreme HardshipAnalysis to Extreme Cruelty Cases
The extreme cruelty provision requires all the same elements
as the extreme hardship provision, except that it adds the "extreme
cruelty" requirement and requires fewer years in the United States to
bring a claim. 177 Therefore, the analysis is the same, except that
Congress never labeled the "extreme cruelty" finding as discretionary.
This Note proposes that courts use a per se approach to determine
whether the plaintiff was subject to extreme cruelty: for example, if
the plaintiff was subject to a pattern of violence, then extreme cruelty
occurred per se. This type of analysis is similar to the one used to
determine whether a petitioner is of "good moral character."
For the most part, extreme cruelty determinations would
remain discretionary. However, when plaintiffs are subject to certain
categories of abuse, the decision would become non-discretionary and
therefore reviewable by the federal courts. Though Congress has not
created this type of category, as it did with "good moral character," the
Ninth Circuit helped envision the types of categories Congress should
create. The Ninth Circuit noted that when domestic violence rises to
the level of battered woman syndrome, the court should treat even the
periods of calm and reconciliation between the episodes of violence as
"extreme cruelty." The Ninth Circuit articulated why this finding is
necessary, and the wording of the INS definition of "extreme cruelty"

175. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
176. See Sepulveda, 407 F.3d at 62-63 (holding that courts have "jurisdiction to review
nondiscretionary decisions regarding an alien's eligibility for relief' under the hardship principle,
and noting that other circuits have held that "judicial review of nondiscretionary, or purely legal,
decisions regarding an alien's eligibility for § 1229b relief' is not barred).
177. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b)(2). Note that "extreme hardship" is one of the elements of the
battered spouse provision. Id. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(v).
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further supports this viewpoint. 178 Therefore, if a petitioner can
establish a pattern of violence and contrition akin to that exhibited by
those suffering from battered woman syndrome, the court should find
that the petitioner meets the extreme cruelty requirement.
Though not yet recognized by courts, a pattern of violence and
calm also can exist between parent and child. 179 Therefore, similar to
the spousal per se category, if a child can establish a pattern of
violence and calm, he or she should be considered to have established
the extreme cruelty requirement per se, even if the actual violence did
not occur on U.S. soil.
Beyond these per se categories, the extreme cruelty decision
should remain discretionary and therefore non-reviewable. A
petitioner can prove her extreme cruelty claim with evidence of either
battery or individual acts amounting to "extreme cruelty."18 0 If the
petitioner has experienced physical violence, she usually will satisfy
the extreme cruelty requirement by providing evidence of battery.
Thus, the term "extreme cruelty" will come to refer only to
nonphysical abuse, such as extreme verbal, psychological, emotional
abuse, or extreme assault. Although some may argue that courts
should view assault as extreme cruelty per se, policy does not require
extending the non-discretionary category this far. Whether a
particular instance of assault rises to "extreme" levels is an inherently
discretionary decision. Therefore, when the petitioner alleges assault
or, similarly, psychological or emotional abuse, the decision will
remain a discretionary one.
The
Supreme
Court has articulated
several
policy
considerations that can be read to support a per se approach to the
extreme cruelty determination. First, the Court has mandated that
there is a "strong presumption in favor of judicial review of
administrative actions." 18 1 The per se approach is thus appropriate
because it broadens a petitioner's right to judicial review when she
would not have that opportunity otherwise.

178. See Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 840 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[D]efining extreme
cruelty to encompass 'abusive actions' that 'may not initially appear violent but that are part of
an overall pattern of violence,' [the INS definition] protects women against manipulative tactics
aimed at ensuring the batterer's dominance and control." (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi)
(2007))).
179. See LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT: ADDRESSING THE
IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS 6-7 (2002) (stating that batterers often

replicate their abusive behavior toward their spouses in their interactions with their children).
180. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000).
181. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001).
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Second, the Supreme Court recognizes the "long-standing
principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation
statutes in favor of the alien."'18 2 Therefore, the ambiguous extreme
cruelty decision should be resolved in a way that allows for judicial
review whenever it is feasible, which the per se approach allows. The
circuit split is evidence of confusion among courts about whether the
extreme cruelty determination is discretionary or not. In the face of
this ambiguity, the courts should grant judicial review by ruling that
extreme cruelty is non-discretionary.
C. Why Extreme Cruelty Merits a More Lenient Approach than
Extreme Hardship
Though the "extreme hardship" determination does not allow
for a per se approach to the element of extreme hardship, this does not
imply necessarily that extreme cruelty should be precluded from such
an interpretation. The two provisions, though similar, have not been
treated the same by Congress. Congress has been more protective of
the battered spouse provision than of the extreme hardship provision.
For example, when Congress passed IIRAIRA in 1996, it reworked the
extreme hardship provision to make it harder for petitioners to
utilize. 8 3 However, Congress has never acted in a similar way to
restrict the scope of the battered spouse provision. On the contrary, it
has made it more accessible to petitioners by liberalizing selfpetitioning laws for applicants under the provision.1 84 Such changes
indicate that the two provisions are not equal in the eyes of Congress.
Moreover, the battered spouse provision is less amenable to abuse
because it is harder to claim extreme cruelty than extreme hardship.
Finally, petitioners claiming extreme cruelty are members of an
acutely vulnerable demographic who do not have the support of their
spouses when petitioning and thus likely are not well-represented at
the agency level. Therefore, they warrant the highest levels of
protection.
V. CONCLUSION
The circuit split over whether extreme cruelty is a
discretionary or non-discretionary determination for the purposes of
cancellation of deportation for battered spouses is largely a result of

182. Id. at 320 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)).
183. See infra Part IV.A.
184. See id.
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the differences in the facts of the cases that the circuits have faced.
Where the facts were extremely sympathetic, as in Hernandez, the
circuit court decided the case favorably by incorporating current
theories of the psychology of domestic violence to hold that extreme
cruelty decisions were non-discretionary and reviewable. However,
when later cases arose with less compelling facts, in which the abuse
alleged was not sufficient for the courts to invoke theories of the
psychology of domestic violence, the courts saw fit to defer to the
agency's determination of extreme cruelty, calling it discretionary and
non-reviewable.
Both approaches, though conflicting, are reasonable given the
facts of the cases. Thus, courts considering this issue should
implement a per se approach to extreme cruelty decisions. When the
facts invoke theories of the psychology of domestic violence, such as
battered woman syndrome, the court should hold that the extreme
cruelty decision is non-discretionary and therefore reviewable.
However, when the abuse does not rise to this threshold (i.e. is purely
verbal abuse or assault) the court should hold that the extreme cruelty
decision is discretionary and therefore not reviewable.
Although this solution keeps the extreme cruelty determination
discretionary in most cases, it carves out an exception in cases where
the abuse is "extreme." Congress intended the battered spouse
provision to be an ameliorative law. As such, courts should apply the
provision in a manner most favorable to the petitioner. A severely
abused immigrant should be given a chance to appeal her deportation
cancellation to the federal courts. This solution enables an applicant to
do so while preserving efficiency and minimizing the abuse of
immigration laws by limiting the right of appeal to cases in which the
abuse is extreme. To vindicate Congress, Courts need discretion to
help remedy the problem of domestic abuse, a problem not proved
easily in court, often misunderstood by society, and historically left
under-addressed by the legal system.
Anna Byrne
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